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ARE WE A ‘SOCIETY OF HONOUR’? RECONSTRUCTION 
OF THE TERM ‘HONOUR’ IN SELECTED JUDICIAL DE-





 The concept of ‘honour’1 was already keeping company with mankind back 
in Antiquity.2 Terms such as ‘word of honour’, ‘honourable conduct’ or ‘man 
without honour’ can be found in the literature of bygone centuries,3 as well as 
in colloquial speech or everyday publications in the press. In numerous texts 
tackling the issue of this particular concept in the context of law, honour is 
portrayed as a guideline for proper conduct, the violation of which entails a 
specific social sanction, or as a master value that requires protection, for ex-
ample in the form of lynching.4 To emphasise the significance of honour, cer-
tain writers even use the term ‘honour societies’,5 meaning such societies 
where honour plays a special role as the main tool in regulating social rela-
tions. 
 As traditional societies, honour societies are frequently set against mod-
ernised societies,6 in which—in the authors’ opinion—honour has lost its 
overriding  significance,   giving   way   to   other   tools  for  regulating  social  
 
 
                                                                
* Translation of the paper into English has been financed by the Minister of Science and 
Higher Education as part of agreement no. 848/P-DUN/2018. Translated by Jonathan Weber. 
1 The issue of the definition of honour is discussed later in the article. 
2 J. Cambell, The Greek hero, in: J.G. Peristiany, J. Pitt-Rivers (eds.), Honor and Grace in 
Anthropology, CUP, Cambridge 1992: 129–150.   
3 Honour and honourable behaviour constituted a motif in such great works as The Iliad by 
Homer, The Song of Roland, Hamlet by William Shakespeare, or Konrad Wallenrod by Adam 
Mickiewicz. 
4 For example: L. Welchman, S. Hossain (eds.), ‘Honour’: Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence 
Against Women, Zed Books, London 2005; M. Cooney, Warriors and Peacemakers: How Third 
Parties Shape Violence, NYU Press, New York 1998; J. Janssen, Your Honour of Your Life? An 
Exploration of Honour Cases for Police Officers and Other Professionals, Stapel & De Koning, 
The Hague 2009. 
5 Other definitions may also be found in literature: honour cultures or honour worlds. For 
more, cf.: M. Cooney, op. cit.; A. Appiah, The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen, 
W.W. Norton & Company, New York– London 2010; A. Gill, Reconfiguring ‘Honour’-Based Vio-
lence as a Form of Gendered Violence, in: M.M. Idriss, T. Abbas (eds.), Honour, Violence, Women 
and Islam, Routledge, London 2011; R. Nisbett, D. Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology of 
Violence in the South, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1996. 
6 For example: V. Baxter, A.V. Margavio, Honor, self and social reproduction, Journal for the 
Theory of Social Behaviour 41(2), 2010: 126. 
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relations, for example the law or concept of dignity.7 Such a position is often 
tied to the thesis that honour plays a special role in those societies where 
powerful central authorities are lacking.8 
 A question that emerges here, however, is whether basing the division 
between modernised and traditional societies on the juxtaposition of law and 
honour as the main tools of regulating social relations—constituting the 
foundations of the concepts under discussion—is legitimate. In societies in 
which law is the main regulator of social relations, has honour really lost its 
significance? Or perhaps this is a significantly more complicated issue? And 
ultimately: what role does honour play in Polish legal culture? 
 The problem is exceedingly complex and requires in-depth and multi-
faceted analysis. Because this article is intended to provoke further discus-
sion, the deliberations that follow shall be limited to a specific issue: recon-
struction of the concept of honour in the judicial practice of Polish courts. 
Later in the article I shall answer the following questions: does the term 
‘honour’ appear in the rulings of Polish courts? And if so, how is it defined? 
What legal provisions contain this concept? 
 Embracing the judicial practice of Polish courts within the scope of the 
research will enable not only the identification of legal provisions referring 
(in fact or potentially) to honour, but also the indication of how this particular 
concept is conceived by the parties to court proceedings and by judges.9 The 
article discusses selected rulings by Polish courts, both ordinary and adminis-
trative courts, of all levels, not limited in terms of territory to a particular 
appellate court’s jurisdiction or voivodeship.10 In the preliminary research, 75 
judgments, together with their justifications, were analysed. The key used for 
their selection was the occurrence of the word ‘honour’ [in Polish: ‘honor’], or 
an inflection of this word. The judgments covered below do not exhaust the 
entirety of the material analysed, but due to the extensiveness of the subject-
matter the article omits those rulings in which honour—in various configura-
tions—played only an incidental role, bearing no significance for the factual 
state, for the case’s proceedings, or for the adjudication issued, as well as 
rulings in which the court’s reasoning coincided with that presented in some 
other  judgment.  However,  before  I  move  on  to  discuss  the findings of the  
 
                                                                
7 Ibidem: 123–124. Such a concept may also be considered in categories of the colonisation 
and juridisation of the lifeworld (J. Habermas, Teoria działania komunikacyjnego [The Theory of 
Communicative Action], vol. 2: Przyczynek do krytyki rozumu funkcjonalnego [Lifeworld and 
System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason], trans. A. Kaniowski, Warsaw 2002). 
8 J. Janssen, op. cit.: 27. Peter Berger in turn believes that an overriding role for honour is 
typical of traditional communities featuring hierarchisation and connecting the individual’s 
identity with a strictly designated and institutional role in the hierarchy. In this view, honour 
loses significance in societies based on the freedom and equality of individuals. For more, cf.: 
P. Berger, On the obsolescence of the concept of honor, European Journal of Sociology 11(2), 
1970: 339–347. 
9 Attention was drawn to the possibility of parties to court proceedings citing action in de-
fence of violated honour in the context of the potential for such motive to be recognised by judges 
as a circumstance mitigating the punishment, despite there being no such circumstance in the 
law in force, by Peter Berger: idem, op. cit.: 339. 
10 Source: website: Portal Orzeczeń Sądów Powszechnych, System Informacji Prawnej Lex. 
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analysis, I would like to discuss the definitions of two key concepts here: hon-
our, and society of honour. 
 
 
II. DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS 
 
 Academic literature contains many definitions and descriptions of the 
meaning of the concept of honour.11 These definitions may, in principle, be 
split into two main categories: 1) showing honour in a universal manner, not 
relativized in regard to a particular gender, as the reflection of others’ opin-
ions regarding an individual, or as an expression of mental experiences, and 
also 2) showing honour in the context of social roles, as a manifestation of the 
gender inequality of the sexes. 
 An author fitting the first kind of definition is Mark Cooney, who de-
scribed honour by indicating its ten main attributes, asserting among other 
things that honour is the kind of moral system in which reputation—
understood as others’ opinion regarding an individual—is a special value.12 
Julian Pitt-Rivers, drawing attention to both the internal and external as-
pects of honour, understands the term as a person’s worth in their own eyes 
and in the eyes of society, and at the same time shows honour as a kind of 
relationship of obligation—granting the individual both the claim and the 
right to pride and dignity, recognised and respected by the external world.13 
A similar position was taken by Janine Janssen, like Yücel Yeşilgöz and 
Sadik Harchaoui distinguishing external honour (understood as status, repu-
tation) and internal honour (integrity, pride, righteousness). In this under-
standing, external honour is simultaneously social recognition of the individ-
ual’s internal honour, reflected in their honourable conduct.14 
 In the second of the categories in question, the meaning of honour—and 
frequently the very possibility of having it as a trait—are relativized to a 
specific gender. When writing about ‘honour’ violence in Kurdish communi-
ties, Joanne Payton distinguishes ‘female’ honour, namus, translated as obe-
dience, and male honour, sharaf, meaning self-confidence, domination.15 Oth-
er writers attach namus to cleanliness and innocence,  and sharaf to prestige,  
 
 
                                                                
11 Apart from the concepts discussed later, it is worth pointing out that deliberations on the 
subject of honour can also be found in the works of authors such as Max Weber (soziale Ehre) or 
Pierre Bourdieu (M. Weber, Gospodarka i społeczeństwo [Economy and Society], trans. D. La-
chowska, Warsaw 2002; P. Bourdieu, Męska dominacja [Masculine Domination], trans. L. Kop-
ciewicz, Warsaw 2004). 
12 M. Cooney, op. cit.: 131. 
13 J. Pitt-Rivers, Honour and social status, in: J. Peristiany (ed.), Honour and Shame: The 
Values of Mediterranean Society, UChicago Press, Chicago 1966: 21. 
14 J. Janssen, op. cit.: s. 36, citing: Y. Yeşilgöz, S. Harchaoui, Eer voor beginners, in:  F. Bo-
venkerk, M. Komen, Y. Yeşilgöz (ed.), Multiculturaliteit in de strafrechtspleging, The Hague 
2003: 62. A similar understanding of honour can also be found in works by other authors, includ-
ing: F.H. Stewart, Honor, UChicago Press, Chicago 1994: 12. 
15 J. Payton, Collective crimes, collective victims. A case study of the murder of Banaz 
Mahmod, in: M.M. Idriss, T. Abbas (eds.), op. cit.: 69. 
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respect and status.16 The division of honour into ‘female’ and ‘male’ results in 
differentiation in the models of good, or ‘honourable’, conduct, models deriv-
ing from so-called codes of honour, depending on the sex and the social role 
connected to it. Further examples of the categorisation of honour depending 
on gender can be found in deliberations regarding machismo17 and izzat.18 
 The second of the concepts under discussion, ‘society of honour’, is under-
stood in various ways. According to Aisha Gill, societies based on honour 
should be understood as those patriarchal societies in which action with the 
purpose of protecting honour constitutes a mechanism for control over girls 
and women, whose behaviour—and in particular modesty and cleanliness—
becomes a component of the honour of a collective (family, clan, or entire 
community).19 However, such understanding of societies of honour is very 
ethnocentric, and derives from a specific grasp of honour as a tool for control-
ling women’s conduct.20 
 Anthony Appiah describes ‘worlds of honour’ in much broader terms, indi-
cating that in order to resolve whether a particular collective attaches special 
importance to honour, there are two things that should be paid attention to: 
one should first of all analyse whether in the said collective everybody has 
the right to be treated with respect, and secondly—what the right to be re-
spected is based upon. If it is a set of shared norms and values, then we can 
speak of a code of honourable conduct being in force. Thus grasped, honour is 
equated to the right for respect on the basis of conduct in keeping with the 
shared set of norms and value.21 Such an understanding of honour is very 
universal, and is not restricted to specific ethnic or national groups, but it 
does on each occasion require the operationalisation of such concepts as the 
‘right to be respected’, relativized to the group under investigation. 
 Irrespective  of the  definition of culture of honour adopted,  analysis of the 
positions presented above can lead to the conclusion that the manner in 
which societies of honour are grasped (either as a phenomenon  limited to 
specific groups, or as a more universal concept) is closely tied to the under-
standing  of  honour  itself.  It is precisely for this reason that all studies into 
the legitimacy of juxtaposing ‘cultures of honour’ with ‘cultures of law’, based 
on the simple opposition between law an honour, taking Poland as an exam-
ple, should be preceded by a discussion of the fundamental issue: resolving 
whether the concept of honour occurs at all in Polish law, and if so, with what  
                                                                
16 C. van Eck, Purified by Blood: Honour Killings amongst Turks in the Netherlands, Amster-
dam University Press, Amsterdam 2003. 
17 Machismo—a phenomenon seen mainly in the countries of South America and in the Medi-
terranean region; it is an attitude identified with masculinity and honour. For more, cf.: D. Gil-
more (ed.), Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean, American Anthropological 
Association 140, Washington, DC, 1987. 
18 A term translated as honour, used among others in Pakistan. For more, cf. Z. Latif, The si-
lencing of women from the Pakistani Muslim Mirpuri community in violent relationships, in: 
M.M. Idriss, T. Abbas (eds.), op. cit.: 34–36. 
19 A. Gill, Reconfiguring…: 220. 
20 Idem, Introduction: ‘Honour’ and ‘Honour’-Based Violence: Challenging Common Assump-
tions, in: A.K. Gill, C. Strange, K. Roberts (eds.), ‘Honour’ Killing & Violence: Theory, Policy and 
Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2014: 2. 
21 A. Appiah, op. cit. 
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meaning, and in what context. For the reasons indicated above, the analysis 
of this issue has been limited to selected rulings by Polish courts. 
 
 
III. ANALYSIS OF RULINGS BY POLISH COURTS 
 
 Based on the analysis conducted, the selected judicial decisions by Polish 
courts, concerning honour as variously understood, may be split into three 
main categories. The first embraces rulings concerning the honour of the ser-
vice (occupation) performed by a public functionary; the second—cases of 
violence committed in defence of honour; and third—matters in which the 
violation of honour, classed into the catalogue of personal values protected by 
law on the strength of civil or penal law, constitutes the basis of a claim. 
 
1. The honour of service (occupation) 
 
 The first of these categories concerns matters in which the central issue 
constituting the object of the ruling was such conduct by a party to the pro-
ceedings that constituted violation of the ‘honour of the service (occupation)’, 
in effect leading to the administering of a specific disciplinary punishment. 
For example, in the case that ended with a ruling by the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court (NSA) in Warsaw on 10 March 2016 (I OSK 3222/14), a police 
officer was expelled from the service for driving a car under the influence of 
alcohol. The complainant demanded a revision of the disciplinary punish-
ment, considering it incommensurate with the act committed. The NSA dis-
missed the cassation appeal, acceding to the reasoning of the body adminis-
tering the punishment, according to which the complainant ‘by his conduct 
had violated the dignity and honour of the service and the legal order in force, 
values that he had made a commitment to guard when taking his oath’.22 
 One can conclude from an analysis of another judgment23 that honourable 
conduct, both when on duty and when not, constitutes an element of the po-
lice officer’s vocational ethics. In the case in question, police officers were 
involved in socialising during which there was consumption of alcohol, at a 
police station. Photographs from this gathering were released by the media. 
The complainant—one of the participants of this gathering—received a disci-
plinary warning of not being fully fit for service in his position. The said com-
plainant demanded that the administering of this penalty be waived, claim-
ing that ‘the only person who violated the honour, dignity and good name of 
the service is the person who sent the photographs to the media’.24 The Voi-
vodeship Administrative Court (WAS) did not accede to this reasoning, and 
dismissed his complaint, asserting that the penalty administered was ade-
quate for the act committed, which constituted a violation of the honour, dig-
nity and  good name of the service, while the ‘character  of the  police officer’s  
                                                                
22 Ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court (NSA) of 10 March 2016, I OSK 3222/14. 
23 Ruling  of  the  Voivodeship  Administrative  Court  (WSA)  in Łódź of 10 February 2015, 
III SA/Łd 1038/14. 
24 Ibidem. 
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employment, involving a special subordination, means that a disciplinary 
violation can also be committed outside of his hours of duty’.25 
 A disciplinary offence in which the honour, good name and dignity of the 
service is violated can be committed not only by police officers, but also by 
other public functionaries. For example, conduct that constitutes such an 
offence according to the courts’ judicial practice includes a customs officer 
smuggling alcohol and avoiding the payment of excise,26 a soldier’s forging of 
a co-owner’s signature on the contract of sale for a car,27 or a prison officer’s 
incorrect conduct during sick leave.28 
 Analysis of the court rulings referred to can lead to the conclusion that 
where public functionaries are concerned, honour is a determinant of specific 
models of conduct, the violation of which can make it impossible to perform 
the occupation concerned, as well as a component of the norms of their pro-
fessional ethics. These specific requirements regarding proper conduct derive 
from the social role played by those performing public functions, and consti-
tute the foundation of the authority held by the institutions they represent.29 
Moreover, the requirement for honourable conduct steps—in a way—beyond 
the framework of the profession in question, and is binding both when on 
duty and when not. 
 Indicating precise models of honourable conduct is difficult, because ‘these 
requirements result after all not from specific legislative regulations and 
rules of professional ethics […], but also from ethical norms of a general 
character, from relating the manner in which an office is performed to the 
requirements resulting from concepts of indefinable character, such as decen-
cy, honour and honesty’.30 The Supreme Court judgment cited here concerns 
the dignity of the office of public prosecutor, although the deliberations con-
tained within it could refer to other professions performed by persons ful-
filling public functions. In this depiction, honour is a concept that is indefina-
ble in a specific way, while the model of proper—and thereby also honoura-
ble—conduct should, on every occasion, be relativised to the specific circum-
stances of the case. 
 
2. Violence in defence of honour 
 
 The second category of issues covers cases of violence committed ‘in de-
fence of honour’.31 In principle, such motivation behind an action is not rec-
ognised as a circumstance justifying a reduced penalty. As an example, in a 
case underway before the District  Court  in  Środa  Śląska,  Second Criminal  
                                                                
25 Ibidem. 
26 Ruling of the Voivodeship Administrative Court (WSA) in Kraków of 16 September 2010, 
III SA/Kr 1159/09. 
27 Ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court (NSA) of 1 March 2007, I OSK 788/06. 
28 Ruling by the District Court (SR) in Człuchów, Fourth Labour Division, of 11 August 2016, 
IV P 153/15. 
29 Decision by the Supreme Court (SN) of 27 July 2016, SDI 6/16. 
30 Ibidem. 
31 The wording is drawn from the rulings discussed, as used by the court, defendants, or per-
petrators. 
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Division32 (II K 485/15), the perpetrator of an assault and battery that result-
ed in impairment to health lasting for more than seven days said the motive 
for his behaviour was to act ‘in defence of a girl’s honour’.33 The court found 
that it ‘did not discern in the behaviour of T. D. [the perpetrator] any circum-
stances at all that would exclude the illegality of his behaviour or his fault. In 
particular, the motivation given by the accused in his appeal does not consti-
tute such a fact […]’.34 
 In another case, a culprit sentenced for attempted murder using a knife 
justified his behaviour as follows: ‘He did not want to be humiliated further 
by him [his victim], and wanted to protect his honour, and desired only to 
clarify the misunderstandings existing between them’.35 He explained that he 
had not acted with the intention of killing the injured party. As with the pre-
vious ruling, discussed above, in this case as well the court did not recognise 
the perpetrator’s motivation, in wanting to defend or regain his honour, as a 
circumstance justifying more lenient punishment. On the contrary, the court 
recognised that the perpetrator’s action was planned, and guided by his in-
tention to take the life of the injured party, and that there were no circum-
stances in the case excluding the perpetrator’s guilt. 
 However, there are also cases in judicial practice in which the court 
acknowledged the motivation of the perpetrator acting in order to defend 
their own honour as a mitigating circumstance. The example taken here is 
the justification of the ruling in the case under file number VI K 614/14,36 in 
which the District Court in Świdnica acknowledged that the injured party, 
insulting and affronting the accused, had contributed to the escalation in 
their dispute, and provoked the accused to use violence against the injured 
party, resulting in a moderate impairment to their health. At the same time, 
the District Court asserted that ‘in acting in such and not some other man-
ner, the accused—defending his honour—wanted essentially only to show 
that he, because of his age, should play the dominant role in such a teenage 
environment’.37  A   fact   deserving   attention   here   is  that  the  said  court 
emphasised that the accused acted in defence of his honour, thereby also le-
gitimising the motivation discussed above. The case closed with a conditional 
discharge. 
 Interestingly, based on the analysis one can point out cases in which reac-
tion to the alleged violation of honour was only a line of defence taken after 
the incident had happened, and not the perpetrators’ factual motivation. For 
example, in  the case  under file number  III K 142/14,38 conducted  before the  
                                                                
32 Ruling by the District Court (SR) in Środa Śląska, Second Penal Division, of 19 January 
2016, II K 485/15. 
33 Motive given by the perpetrator himself. 
34 Ibidem. 
35 Ruling  by  the  Regional  Court  (SO)  in  Lublin,  Fourth  Penal  Division, of 4 July 2014, 
IV K 12/14. 
36 Ruling  by  the  District  Court  (SR) in Świdnica, Sixth Penal Division, of 22 January 2015, 
VI K 614/14. 
37 Ibidem. 
38 Ruling by the Regional Court (SO) in Białystok, Third Penal Division, of 26 January 2015, 
III K 142/14. 
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Regional Court in Białystok, the accused strived to allege provocation by the 
injured parties, but the Court gave them no credence; the circumstances of 
the case led ‘to the conclusion that the claims of P.D. [the accused]—that the 
misunderstanding was caused by the belief that the Chechens were laughing 
at them—were no more than a ruse. [This was] initially intended to end a 
[situation that was] very awkward for the accused and his companion, who 
claimed to be stronger (and above all better) than the Asian peoples of the 
former USSR, [and was] meant to save their honour in some way, [suggest-
ing] that they [the Chechens] provoked the disturbance during which they 
were beaten up. Later, however, [this was used] as the adopted line of de-
fence’.39 Despite the fact that adopting such a line of defence could suggest 
that the perpetrators using it anticipated a pro-honour approach by the 
courts, in none of the cases cited did the perpetrators’ motive of restoring lost 
honour bring the effect they desired—of a reduced penalty. 
 
3. Honour as a personal value  
 
 The third category of cases invoking the concept of honour embraces those 
judgments in which honour, understood in various way, is perceived as a per-
sonal value, subject to civil and criminal law protection in the event of its 
violation.  
 For example, in the ruling of 17 March 2015, the Court of Appeal in War-
saw recognised that ‘esteem and honour fit within the concept of good 
name’.40 The subject-matter of the case was the disclosure during a television 
programme of the surname of the complainant as a person against whom 
criminal proceedings were underway and had not been completed at the time 
of broadcast. According to the Court of Appeal, the said programme would 
have violated the person’s good name in a situation where the complainant 
was cleared of the deeds of which he was accused. However, the criminal pro-
ceedings related to a portion of the charges ended in conditional discontinu-
ance, therefore determining the guilt and fact that the deed of which the 
complainant was accused had indeed been committed. This eliminated the 
illegality of the deed in relation to these matters. Ultimately, the lack of ille-
gality in the violation of the complainant’s good name, and as such the dis-
missal of the lawsuit, was determined by the fact that the material used in 
the programme had been gathered with care and honesty, in the defence of a 
socially justified interest (which was the warning against the activities of the 
complainant, involving the derivative granting of loans not covered with ap-
propriate security). 
 The illegality of violating honour as a personal value is also excluded by 
permissible criticism. However, the right to criticise is not unrestricted: ‘polit-
ical criticism may be uncompromising and harsh in form, but it must be hon-
est, it must refer to genuine facts, and critical opinions should be grounded in 
facts. An  opponent  should be  properly  prepared   for   conducting  such criti 
                                                                
39 Ibidem. 
40 Ruling by the Court of Appeal (SA) in Warsaw, of 17 March 2015, VI ACa 596/14. 
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cism—and if he or she does not have the appropriate knowledge of the facts, 
then he or she should choose their words carefully’.41 According to the Court 
of Appeal in Kraków, these requirements were not fulfilled in this case,42 the 
subject of which was violation of personal values, meaning the right to es-
teem, honour and good name of the complainant, fulfilling a public function, 
through slander, suggesting that he had misappropriated public money for 
private purposes, had broken building law and lacked honesty and propriety. 
The court acceded to the reasoning presented by the complainant, stating 
that in the matter in question one could not talk of permissible criticism, as 
the statements regarding the complainant were untrue, while their only goal 
was to show this person to the local community in a negative light.  
 In the next judgment43 discussed here, honour is grasped as an expression 
of ‘external esteem’. The subject of the proceedings was the demand that 
compensation be awarded for violation of the complainant company’s good 
name, by which the said company had been accused of violating the rules of 
fair competition and unlawfully offering financial gains. In the ruling’s justi-
fication, the court stated that esteem—embracing the two aspects of ‘external’ 
and ‘internal’—is one of the most important personal values due to every 
person. Internal esteem is ‘personal dignity, constituting the individual’s 
perception of their own worth, which is connected to the expectation of re-
spect from other people’.44 External esteem should be understood as ‘good 
name, good fame, honour, reputation, repute; in other words, it is how others 
perceive and view the individual’.45 The good name of a particular person 
(including a legal person) means a positive image held of this person by their 
milieu, and when appraising its violation one should take into account above 
all the reaction of the community. Since this is the case, then honour as thus 
portrayed has an external dimension, based on others’ opinion and impres-
sions, while the individual’s perception of their own value has been defined as 
personal dignity. The understanding of honour as described here can also be 
found in other judgments.46 
 Honour as an expression of esteem, though without division into its vari-
ous aspects, became the subject of deliberations in the judgment of the Re-
gional Court in Łódź of 22 June 2015.47 In this case, the complainant de-
manded compensation for the violation of his esteem by accusing him, with 
vulgar  words,   of  being  a homosexual.  In the court’s opinion, the ‘esteem of  
 
                                                                
41 Ruling  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  (SA)  in Kraków,  First  Civil  Division, of 24 April 2013, 
I ACa 294/13. 
42 Ibidem. 
43 Ruling  by  the  Regional  Court  (SO)  in  Warsaw,  First  Civil  Division,  of  10 May 2016, 
I C 690/15. 
44 Ibidem. 
45 Ibidem. 
46 Examples: the ruling by the Regional Court (SO) in Warsaw, First Civil Division, of 13 
September 2016, I C 1130/15; the ruling by the Regional Court (SO) in Lublin, Second Appeals 
Division, of 19 May 2016, II Ca 113/16; the ruling by the Regional Court (SO) in Gdańsk, Fif-
teenth Civil Division, of 16 August 2013, XV C 238/13. 
47 Ruling  by  the  Regional  Court  (SO)  in  Łódź,  First  Civil  Division,  of  22  June  2015,  I 
C 1634/14. 
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a person referred to in Article 23 Civil Code,48 should be understood as hon-
our, good name, and personal dignity’, while the ‘terms used by the defend-
ant, when speaking about the complainant, were of a character denigrating 
the complainant’s good name and esteem. This is because the defendant pre-
sented the complainant—in vulgar words—as a person with qualities which 
sadly are not widely approved of in Polish society, and especially in small 
local communities, such as the one in which the complainant lives, and which 
expose the person concerned to exclusion from the community’.49 
 In a judgment on 9 October 201450 the Court of Appeal in Gdańsk ex-
pressed a more radical position, asserting that ‘honour, good repute and re-
spect do not constitute separate personal values, but an emanation of person-
al value in the form of a person’s esteem, understood as their good name and 
dignity. This is also so because they relate to the environment in which a 
specific person functions, and are not objective and identical for all people’. 
 An individual’s honour is subject to legal protection not only on the basis 
of civil law, but also penal law. The subject of a case (VII K 96/15)51 proceed-
ing before the District Court in Opole was the offence of slander in qualified 
form—using means of mass communication (Article 212 (2) of the Criminal 
Code).52 In electoral materials—leaflets and information distributed via 
means of mass communication, including during a press conference—the 
accused libelled the aggrieved party by disseminating false information, ac-
cording to which the aggrieved party contributed to financial irregularities in 
the commune, refused official actions aimed at putting right the irregularities 
detected, and also approached state officials for measures to be taken to the 
detriment of the mayor and the commune. According to the District Court, 
such activity exceeded the boundaries of permissible criticism. The eligibility 
of the act committed with the usage of means of mass communication results 
from the disparity between the parties to the dispute—of ‘an individual 
fighting for her honour with mass media, which have at their disposal enor-
mous persuasive potential for influencing recipients’ opinions’.53 
 The offence of libel, regulated in Article 212 of the Criminal Code, involves 
the  slanderous  accusation  of  a  person  (a  group  of  people, an institution, 
a legal person, an organisational unit) of qualities or conduct that could lower 
their standing in the eyes of the public or expose them to a loss of trust re-
quired for the performance of a specific occupation or activity. Insulting an-
other person in their presence or in their absence, in public or with the inten-
tion that the insult reach  this person  (Article 216 of the Criminal Code),  con 
                                                                
48 Act of 23 April 1964, the Civil Code [Kodeks cywilny], Journal of Laws of the Republic of 
Poland [JL RP] 1964, No. 16, item 93. 
49 Ruling  by  the  Regional   Court  (SO)  in  Łódź,  First  Civil  Division,  of  22  June  2015,  
I C 1634/14. 
50 Ruling  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  (SA)  in Gdańsk, First Civil Division,  of 9 October 2014, 
I ACa 310/14. 
51 Ruling  by  the  District  Court  (SR)  in  Opole,  Seventh  Penal   Division, of 25 April 2016, 
VII K 96/15. 
52 Act of 6 June 1997, the Penal Code [Kodeks karny], JL RP 1997, No. 88, item 553. 
53 Ruling  by  the  District  Court  (SR)  in  Opole,  Seventh  Penal  Division,  of 25 April 2016, 
VII K 96/15. 
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stitutes a similar offence. Both provisions, in their basic and in their qualified 
forms, may constitute a legal mechanism for protecting violated honour (dig-
nity, esteem, good name). 
 
 
IV. HONOUR OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND HONOUR 
OF THE COMMUNITY 
 
 The categorisation of judgments presented in the previous section of the 
article is not the sole possible way of dividing the analysed rulings. In the 
rulings described so far, honour was mainly grasped in regard to the individ-
ual. Even if the court rulings portrayed honour in the ‘external’ aspect, as an 
expression of others’ opinions and perceptions, they applied to the individual 
honour of a specified person (as a rule the complainant or party to penal pro-
ceedings). However, in the judicial practice of Polish courts honour can be 
found in a collective sense—as the honour of a defined collective. 
 The concept of ‘national [the nation’s] honour’ appeared in a ruling by the 
Regional Court in Kraków on 25 April 2016.54 The complainant, a former 
prisoner of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp, demanded that the defendant 
(German television, also running an Internet-based news website) be forbid-
den to use notions of the type ‘Polish concentration camps’, and that it also be 
ordered to publish in Poland-wide daily newspapers and on the television’s 
website a declaration with the indicated content, embracing, inter alia, the 
statement ‘we apologise to Mr K. T. [the complainant], who was imprisoned 
in a German concentration camp, for violating his personal values, in particu-
lar his national identity (his sense of belonging to the Polish Nation) and his 
national dignity’.55 The justification given by the complainant for his claim 
was that the term ‘Polish concentration camps’, included in the trailer to a 
movie published on the website of the accused television, violated his ‘nation-
al honour’. The court acknowledged that ‘the sense of national belonging, and 
pride in such belonging, are among the universally and socially accepted set 
of values that may constitute an important element of the state of a person’s 
awareness and feelings, and that if they are professed and nurtured by a par-
ticular person, they should be acknowledged as this person’s personal values 
subject to the protection anticipated in Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code’.56 
Although ‘national honour’ is not clarified or characterised in the justification 
to this ruling, one may conclude from the ruling’s wording that this concept 
should be linked to national dignity and identity, understood as pride and a 
sense of one’s own value, resulting from belonging to a specific nation. Be-
cause of this, ‘national honour’ is the quality of a certain set of individuals, 
distinguished by their belonging to this specific nation. 
 
 
                                                                
54 Ruling  by  the  Regional  Court  (SO)  in  Kraków,  First  Civil  Division,  of 25 April 2016, 
I C 151/14. 
55 Ibidem. 
56 Ibidem. 
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 In another judgment57 the term ‘culture of honour’ appeared. The subject 
of this case was the murder of the female partner, committed by a person 
originating from Turkey. In the line of defence adopted, the defence cited the 
perpetrator’s intense agitation (Article 148 para. 4 of the Criminal Code), 
brought about by the circumstances and the role of honour—namus—in 
Turkish culture. The defence accused the expert witnesses of omitting in 
their opinions the cultural differences, for which they used the term ‘culture 
of honour’. The court did not accede to the reasoning of the defence, asserting 
that the perpetrator himself omitted in his testimony the contribution of hon-
our to the motivation behind his action. According to the court, a state of in-
tense agitation as indicated in Article 148 para. 4 Criminal Code must be 
justified by objective circumstances, while ‘in this particular case there could 
be no talk of such circumstances providing justification—in Polish conditions 
and in the Polish legal system, even if one were to accept a state of intense 
agitation accompanying the accused’s actions, then the so-called culture of 
honour cited by the defence, but not by the accused himself, cannot constitute 
such a circumstance’.58 The court of the second instance also did not accede to 
the arguments of the public prosecutor, demanding a more severe penalty 
due to general prevention, which in this case would involve ‘deterring others 
originating from different cultural circles characterised by an attitude to-
wards women distinct from the European attitude’.59 As rightly pointed out 
by the court, the circumstances of this case did not justify accepting that cul-
tural differences determined the accused’s conduct, while ‘issues of jealousy 
related to the injured party, as too the desire to keep control over the partner, 





 One can find cases in the judicial practice of Poland’s courts in which hon-
our is a subject-matter. In principle, the judgments analysed were given in 
cases that may be split into three main categories: regarding violation of the 
‘honour of service’, cases of violence in defence of honour, and violations of 
honour as a personal value.  
 The division outlined above is not the only possible way of categorising the 
judgments investigated. Other criteria could be based on the individual or 
collective dimension of honour, on indicating the participant of court proceed-
ings who cites honour, or quite the opposite—on the non-acceptance of such a 
position. The manner of categorisation selected here allows for the most com-
prehensive indication of legal provisions potentially or in fact referring to the 
concept in question. 
 
                                                                
57 Ruling  by  the  Court  of  Appeal (SA) in Warsaw, Second Penal Division, of 21 June 2013, 
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 In relating to this issue, the judgments that were analysed concerned the 
violation of provisions related to the professional ethics of persons performing 
specified public functions (for example: Article 2 of the Act on military service 
for professional soldiers,61 Article 230 of the Act on the prison service,62 or 
paragraph 23 of the Rules of professional ethics for the policeman),63 provi-
sions regarding personal values and their legal protection (23, 24, 448 of the 
Civil Code, and 212 and 216 of the Criminal Code), and provisions sanction-
ing specific deeds prohibited in penal law (for example murder, assault and 
battery, participation in a fight). 
 There is much discrepancy regarding the meaning of honour in the said 
judicial practice. This leads to the conclusion that judges most often use their 
own, intuitive understanding of this concept. In the rulings analysed, the 
definition of honour was either omitted, in certain cases the concept even 
being described as undefinable, or a certain form of ostensive definition was 
used, indicated selected positive (or negative) aspects of honourable conduct. 
Honour was portrayed in its internal aspect, as an expression of the feeling of 
one’s own value, or external—as a reflection of others’ opinion of the individ-
ual. As a rule, however, it was pointed out that the appraisal of whether or 
not honour had been violated in a given case could not be generalised, and on 
every occasion the circumstances of the case needed to be analysed. In none of 
the rulings analysed did the judges make a distinction between ‘female’ and 
‘male’ honour. 
 The question that arises is to what degree making use of the concept of 
honour was purely a rhetorical measure, and to what extent it was accompa-
nied by a specific axionormative intention. In the case of rulings citing the  
honour of service (occupation), honour was portrayed as a component of nor-
mative models of proper conduct (‘honourable’ behaviour). In cases belonging 
to the second category, embracing various forms of violence, acting in its de-
fence constituted a motive behind the perpetrators’ actions—either a genuine 
motive or one adopted later as a line of defence. In most court proceedings, 
though, acting in response to a violation of honour by a party to the trial was 
not recognised by the judges as a circumstance justifying a reduced sentence, 
and it no case was it the sole circumstance for mitigation. The court also took 
into account such circumstances as the perpetrator’s young age or lack of a 
criminal record. In regard to cases involving the violation of honour as a per-
sonal value, honour was depicted as a separate personal value, or as an ema-
nation of esteem, dignity or good name, and often as a synonym of these con-
cepts. 
 Honour, as opposed to esteem, is not covered by the catalogue of personal 
values in Article  23  of  the  Civil  Code. This catalogue, though, is not closed,  
                                                                
61 Act of 11 September 2003 on military service for professional soldiers [Ustawa o służbie 
wojskowej żołnierzy zawodowych], JL RP 2003, No. 179, item 1750. 
62 Act of 9 April 2010 on the prison service [Ustaw o służbie więziennej], JL RP 2010, No. 79, 
item 523. 
63 Disposition no. 805 of the Police Commander in Chief of 31 December 2003, regarding the 
‘Rules of the policeman’s occupational ethics’ [Zasady etyki zawodowej policjanta], Dz. Urz. KGP 
2004, no. 1, item 3. 
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and as such expanding it to embrace additional values is possible. The inclu-
sion of honour within the category of personal values gives rise to a number 
of further implications. Above all, personal values are acknowledged univer-
sally in society and accepted by a given legal system.64 In the traditional view 
personal values, as unqualified rights, are effective erga omnes.65 Since this is 
so, acknowledging honour as a personal value means granting it special legal 
protection. However, this protection is not absolute in character, and in a 
specific legal situation may be limited due to being in conflict with other, 
more crucial rights and interests.66 An example of such a situation is the ex-
clusion of the unlawfulness of the violation of a personal value, for example 
via permitted criticism, admissible due to freedom of speech.  
To conclude, it is worth observing that in the majority of the judgments 
analysed, honour was not an element of the content of the provisions cited by 
parties, while their application in a specific case resulted from the interpreta-
tion of legal regulations by the participants in the court proceedings and by 
the judges. This observation, indicating that honour is acknowledged and 
accepted as a value irrespective of its articulation within the wording of pro-
visions, is an important starting point for further research into the role and 
significance of honour in Polish legal culture.  
 
Joanna Ptak-Chmiel 





ARE WE A ‘SOCIETY OF HONOUR’? RECONSTRUCTION OF THE TERM ‘HONOUR’ 
IN SELECTED JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF POLISH COURTS 
 
S u m m a r y 
 
The existence of honour as a particular value is not unique, restricted to the boundaries of 
certain states, nationalities or ethnicities only. Yet, a distinction can be found in the literature 
between so-called ‘societies of honour’ and ‘modernised societies’. It is believed that in ‘societies of 
honour’ honour plays a central role in regulating social relations, and in ‘modernised societies’ 
based on the rule of law its importance is marginalised. This article is a contribution to the dis-
cussion on the adequacy of the discussed division based on the example of Polish society. Due to 
the fact that an important feature of this distinction is the juxtaposition of law and honour as 
tools for regulating social relations, the starting point of the analysis of this issue is to answer 
the question whether the concept of ‘honour’ exists in Polish law, and if so, how it is defined and 
in what contexts it appears. Due to the complexity of this issue, the subject of the article was 
limited to a specific problem – the analysis of selected judgments of Polish courts and the reasons 
underlying these judgments. The research allowed to identify the provisions of Polish law which 
refer (or could refer) to honour. Based on the analysis made, it may be stated that both, judges as 
well as parties to court proceedings, consider honour as a protected, legally accepted value. 
                                                                
64 Z. Radwański, Prawo cywilne—część ogólna, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2003: 156. 
65 J. Sadomski, Ochrona czci (dobrego imienia) w polskim prawie cywilnym i karnym—
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